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JANUARY 2020

POLICY BRIEF
Supply Shock versus Demand Shock
The Local Efects of New Housing in Low-Income Areas
Brian J. Asquith, Evan Mast, and Davin Reed
BRIEF HIGHLIGHTS
n Policymakers worry that new
market-rate apartment buildings
in gentrifying neighborhoods could
raise nearby rents and accelerate
gentrification.
n New buildings could change
nearby amenities or neighborhood
reputation, increasing demand for
the neighborhood enough to offset the
effect of increasing supply.
n We test this hypothesis and find
that new market-rate apartment
buildings in low-income central city
areas instead slow rent increases.
n New market-rate apartment
buildings also increase the number of
people migrating from other lowincome neighborhoods to the nearby
area.
n Our findings suggest that the
supply provided by new apartment
buildings is more important to
rent prices than any impacts on
neighborhood amenities or reputation.
n Amenity and reputation effects
may be weak because most new
buildings go into already-gentrifying
areas, absorbing existing demand
instead of sparking new demand.
For additional details, see the working
paper at https://research.upjohn.org/up_
workingpapers/316/.

P

ublic frustration over escalating housing costs has steadily risen, particularly in large
urban centers, as rents eat up a larger and larger portion of take-home pay. A commonly
suggested solution is to allow developers to build more market-rate housing, which
should lower rents by increasing supply. Previous research suggests that this will indeed
reduce housing costs on average, but many think that this overall beneft comes with a
signifcant cost—new development could raise rents in the immediately surrounding
neighborhood.
Tis runs counter to standard economic models of supply and demand, but a slightly
more complicated story could generate this result. Te story is particularly plausible in
low-income or gentrifying neighborhoods. Because new units are typically expensive,
they are usually flled by high-income households. Tese households could attract new
stores, restaurants, or other amenities, and they could also signal that a neighborhood is
changing in a way that is attractive to other high-income households. If these amenity
or reputation changes are large, they could increase demand for the neighborhood
by enough to completely ofset the increase in supply, causing rents to increase and
accelerating gentrifcation.
Tis story has substantial infuence in the policy debate, leading many policymakers
and residents to strongly oppose new market-rate housing developments in low-income
areas. However, there is currently very little evidence for or against the idea. Our recent
working paper flls the gap in knowledge by testing this theory directly.
We fnd that new market-rate apartment buildings in low-income areas do not
accelerate gentrifcation. Instead, they slow rent increases in nearby apartments
and increase the number of people who move into the area from other low-income
neighborhoods. Tus, the efect of new supply appears to outweigh any amenity or
reputation improvements. Te latter may be small because new housing, even in
currently low-income areas, goes into areas that are already gentrifying. Tis implies
that new developments serve mainly to absorb existing demand for an area rather than
to generate new demand. In turn, this reduces pressures on nearby rents because many
high-income households move to the new building rather than outbidding lower-income
households for nearby apartments.

Where Are New Apartment Buildings Constructed?
We start with the most basic question: Where do developers build new market-rate
apartments? We focus on a setting where the afordability crisis is worst, the housing
debate is most contentious, and the amenities story is most plausible: large (50+) unit
apartment buildings constructed in low-income, central city neighborhoods of major
market cities between 2010 and 2019. Tese cities are Atlanta, Austin, Boston, Brooklyn,
Chicago, Denver, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Portland, San Francisco, and Washington,
D.C.
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If amenity or reputation
efects of a new building
are large, it could
increase demand for
the neighborhood by
enough to completely
ofset the increase in
supply, causing rents to
increase and accelerating
gentrifcation.

Table 1 compares low-income neighborhoods (defned as a census tract with median
household income below the metropolitan area median) that received a new building to
those that did not.1 Two striking patterns emerge. First, while 2010 household income
is similar across the two groups, the areas that received a new building saw much larger
increases in income during both the 2000–2010 and 2010–2017 time period. Second,
areas receiving construction had substantially higher levels of college education, which
is ofen considered a leading indicator of gentrifcation. Tese patterns suggest that
developers tend to target areas that are already changing, rather than attempting to
kickstart gentrifcation in previously stable neighborhoods.
In short, new developments are correlated with gentrifcation, but they follow it
rather than precede it. Tis is likely because relatively high rents are necessary to make
new construction feasible, so developers do not build in areas where they cannot charge
those rents. Note that these patterns are specifc to large apartment buildings but may be
diferent for other types of construction.
Table 1 Building Neighborhood Characteristics
Household income
2000 ($)
2010 ($)
2017 ($)
2000–2010 (pct)
2010–2017 (pct)
College degree
2000 (pct)
2010 (pct)
2017 (pct)
Number of tracts

No building

Some building

47,190
45,097
47,129
−4.4
4.5

44,998
48,181
63,771
7.1
32.4

18
23
27
2,459

33
44
55
1,094

NOTE: Means of the characteristics of the neighborhoods (census tracts) which received new buildings or not.
“Some building” column means are weighted by the number of buildings in each neighborhood. Samples
of buildings and neighborhoods are described in detail in the working paper: https://research.upjohn.org/
up_workingpapers/316/.
SOURCE: Real Capital Analytics, Census 2000 Long Form (“2000”), American Community Survey 2006–2010 5-Year
Estimates (“2010”), and American Community Survey 2013–2017 5-Year Estimates (“2017”).

How Do New Buildings Afect Nearby Rents?
We then use data on individual rent listings provided by Zillow to assess the central
question in the policy debate: Do new buildings in low-income areas increase rents? We
focus on buildings built between 2015 and 2016 in order to be able to observe at least
three years of data before and afer construction.
Te major challenge to estimating causal efects is that new buildings are not
randomly placed. Developers target areas where rent is rising fast and is expected to
continue to rise in the future. Because of this, a simple comparison of rents in areas that
did and did not get new construction (similar to our income comparison in Table 1)
would likely show that rents increased by more near new buildings. However, this
diference would not necessarily be caused by the new building. We use two quasiexperiments to overcome this problem.
First, we compare a treatment group very close to the new building (within 250
meters) to a control group slightly further away (between 250 and 600 meters). Te
idea is that while developers might well target a specifc neighborhood, they cannot
choose exactly when and where to build because not every parcel is for sale or able to be
A census tract is an area with about 4,000 people.
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We fnd that new
apartment buildings in
low-income areas do not
accelerate gentrifcation.
Instead, they slow rent
increases in nearby
apartments and increase
migration from other lowincome neighborhoods.
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developed. Tis means that within a small area, the exact placement of a new building is
relatively random, making our treatment and control group close to identical except that
the treatment group is closer to the new building. Tis strategy is good for picking up
very local efects of new buildings, like new retail options or the aesthetic improvement
of replacing a vacant lot.
However, new buildings might have broader amenity or reputation efects that
extend beyond that geographically small treatment and control group. To account for
these, we construct a second “experiment.” We compare rents near sites developed in
2015–2016 (our treatment group) to those near sites that were developed in 2019 (our
control group). Te idea is that these two groups of sites are both appealing to developers
but were not developed at the same time due to random delays in the land acquisition,
fnancing, city approval, or construction processes. Because our treatment buildings are
no longer in the same neighborhood as control buildings, we can detect changes in rents
that are caused by efects that span a larger geography.
Both approaches suggest that new buildings decrease rents by 5 to 7 percent relative
to what they otherwise would be. In both cases, we fnd that rents were following similar
trends in the treatment and control groups before the buildings were completed, but rent
increases slow sharply in the treatment areas immediately afer the buildings’ completion.
Tis efect remains constant for the three postconstruction years that we can observe
before our sample ends, and, in a separate estimation, we fnd no evidence that efects
change when we focus on earlier buildings and observe fve years afer completion.
We note that this efect is relative to what rents would be had the building not been
constructed—our fnding does not mean that rents decreased in absolute terms. Because
our treatment areas are the places most likely to experience the positive amenity and
reputation efects that could cause rents to increase, we take this as strong evidence that
new buildings in low-income areas decrease rather than increase rents.

Do New Buildings Afect Who Moves into the Surrounding Neighborhood?
Last, we study how a new development changes in-migration to the surrounding
neighborhood (excluding the new building itself). We do so using address history data
from Infutor Data Solutions, a marketing intelligence company. Te data do not include
information on individuals’ incomes, so we instead construct outcomes using the average
income in migrants’ origin neighborhoods.
Figure 1 shows trends in the number of high-income arrivals within 250 meters
of buildings completed in 2014 or 2015 in a low-income neighborhood.2 We defne
high-income movers as those who moved from a neighborhood with income above
the metropolitan median. As shown in the black line, the total number of high-income
arrivals does increase by about 20 percent following a building’s completion. However,
this increase is entirely driven by arrivals to the new building itself (the red line). Te
blue line, which shows the number of arrivals to the area within 250 meters excluding the
new building, remains fat or declines slightly afer construction.
While this suggests that a new building does not drastically change in-migration to
a neighborhood, it does not provide causal evidence on the building’s efect. In our fnal
exercise, we repeat the quasi-experiments that we used to study rent but instead use the
origin neighborhood income of in-migrants as the outcome. We fnd that new buildings
increase the number of arrivals from neighborhoods with average income below twothirds of the metropolitan area median by three percentage points and reduce average
origin income by a similar amount. Te increase in low-income arrivals implies that new
buildings also decrease rents for relatively cheap units, not just the expensive units that
are their most direct competitors. More directly, the new buildings appear to allow more
low-income households to move to these frequently gentrifying neighborhoods.
Our migration data contain one less year than our rent data, so we shift the buildings we study back by
one year.
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Figure 1 In-Migration to Areas around New Buildings
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Most new marketrate buildings go into
already-changing areas,
suggesting they follow
rather than cause
gentrifcation.
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NOTE: This fgure shows trends in the number of in-migrants from tracts with income above the MSA-median to
the area within 250 meters of new buildings. Nonbuilding migrants are those arriving to the area within 250
meters but not the new building, building migrants are arrivals to the new building itself, and total migrants is
the sum. The sample includes 2011–2017 moves within 250 meters of new buildings completed in 2014–2015.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using data from Infutor Data Solutions and the U.S. Census Bureau.

Policy Implications
Te housing approval process in low-income and gentrifying areas is contentious,
ofen because of concerns that new buildings will accelerate rent increases and
neighborhood change. Our evidence suggests that this is typically not the case. Instead,
new buildings slow nearby rent increases and increase the ability of individuals from
low-income neighborhoods to move to the nearby area. While the neighborhoods
containing new buildings do gain richer residents, the gain is concentrated in the new
building. Tis efectively diverts high-income individuals from outbidding low-income
individuals for units in the nearby preexisting buildings. Te new housing thus helps
absorb the pressure from the increasing number of high-income individuals that want to
live in central city neighborhoods. Moreover, by allowing more low-income households
to move to an area, new housing helps these rapidly changing neighborhoods remain
economically integrated, which research suggests promotes economic mobility for lowincome residents.
On the whole, new market-rate housing appears to beneft not just the region but also
the local neighborhood. Tis suggests that market-rate housing should be an important
part of any solution to the housing afordability crisis. Fears of increased rents near
new buildings should not prevent governments from implementing desired reforms to
regional housing supply.
We note two important caveats to our fndings. First, we estimate an average efect
that may disguise variation across diferent types of buildings and neighborhoods.
Amenity and reputation efects are highly subjective and may vary widely depending
on the local context. Second, the buildings in our sample are in the types of places that
developers historically have wanted to build. While these areas are central to the debate,
the efects may be diferent in other types of neighborhoods. For example, developers
rarely build market-rate units in very low-income areas with high vacancy rates, so our
results do not speak to what would happen if they did.
W.E. Upjohn Institute for
Employment Research
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